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ABSTRACT
Why do Westerners become foreign fighters in civil conflicts? We
explore this question through original data collection on German
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and test three sets of hypotheses
that revolve around socioeconomic integration, online radicalization,
and social network mobilization. We conduct link analysis to map the
network of German foreign fighters prior to their mobilization, and
marshal evidence to assess the validity of competing explanations.
We find only modest support for the integration deficit hypothesis,
and meager support for the social media radicalization theory.
Instead, the preponderance of evidence suggests that interpersonal
ties largely drive the German foreign fighter phenomenon.
Recruitment featured clustered mobilization and bloc recruitment
within interconnected radical milieus, leading us to conclude that






In January 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) boasted on its social media that
26-year-old Robert Baum, also known as Uthman al-Almani, had blown himself up in the
Syrian village of al-Kafat, allegedly killing “50 unbelievers” in the process.1 When the news
reached Baum’s hometown of Solingen—a midsize city on the edge of Germany’s indus-
trial heartland—it prompted a series of now familiar questions: Why did this “shy,
introverted boy” end his own life murdering strangers in a faraway land? How did this
young German, a convert to Islam, radicalize? Why are an increasing number of Germans
aspiring to emulate Baum’s path to murderous self-destruction?
Germany is not the only European nation engaging in this type of soul searching.
Western fighters have flocked to the Syrian and Iraqi war zones on an unprecedented
scale. The best international estimate holds that approximately 5,000 Western Europeans
have joined the fray since 2011.2 In total, about 30,000 men and women from at least 86
countries have traveled to these conflicts, making the contingent of Western combatants
among the largest at nearly 17%. ISIS has claimed the majority of these volunteers.3
There is a burgeoning scholarly literature on the foreign fighters phenomenon, but little
consensus as to its main causal drivers. Most studies hone in on foreign fighters’
biographies and demographic data as they describe those who have been recruited or
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volunteered in Syria and Iraq,4 Afghanistan and Pakistan,5 Chechnya,6 and Somalia.7 Few
have theorized the underlying motivations that drive young men and women to join
distant conflicts by examining the pull factors, which is to say the recruitment messages
that militant organizations rely on to lure foreign combatants to their cause.8 Others
consider the push factors, what Thomas Hegghammer calls the “underlying determinants
of supply.”9
This study maintains that social network analysis could bridge these two perspectives. It
contends that pull factors such as visceral appeals to aid suffering Muslims are undoubt-
edly central to foreign fighter mobilization, but such appeals do not create geographically
diffused mobilization patterns within a national territory. Instead, their effect is limited to
local, peer-to-peer social networks as evinced by clustered mobilization and small-group
recruitment from within preexisting radical milieus. This suggests that local networks are
a critical push factor, much more significant than the often cited drivers of foreign fighter
recruitment, including failed integration and social media radicalization.
Original data from German foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq allows us to evaluate three
sets of hypotheses concerning foreign fighter mobilization: integration deficit, online
radicalization, and social network mobilization. This data provides strong support for
the social network hypotheses and some support for the integration deficit one, but
there is meager support for the online radicalization theory. This finding constitutes a
bit of “good news” for concerned European publics because identifying, monitoring, and
dismantling peer-to-peer networks is perhaps a less daunting challenge for governments
and their security agencies than devising social integration policies in the context of mass
migration and a refugee crisis, or countering radicalization within the ubiquitous and
rapidly evolving social media sphere.
We proceed as follows. First, we review the key literature surrounding foreign fighter
recruitment and generate testable implications for the German case study. Next, we
preview our research design and empirical strategy, explaining our original dataset and
other German-language security reports that inform our theory testing. We then proceed
to analyze the German data and draw inferences regarding the integration deficit, online
radicalization, and social network hypotheses. We conclude by summarizing our empirical
findings and highlighting the strong support for the social network approach. We also
suggest three possible research extensions that emerge out of our study.
Explanations of foreign fighter recruitment
Following David Malet, we define foreign fighters as “noncitizens of conflict states who
join insurgencies during civil conflicts.”10 In recent history, these volunteers often engage
in direct combat roles and even end up as suicide bombers.11 However, not all of the
individuals that travel to conflict zones actually engage in combat; some undertake
support roles within insurgent organizations. In this study, we treat such individuals as
foreign combatants because we do not always know with certainty what their roles are
once they join a conflict zone, or how their roles might evolve over time. It is possible that
noncombatant volunteers could be activated as fighters at a future date, especially when
confronted with a major counterinsurgent force. Moreover, their organizational support
for combatants is usually beneficial to an insurgent movement, making them potential
targets for counterinsurgent forces as if they were combatants.
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Malet’s comprehensive historical treatment of the foreign fighter phenomenon main-
tains that recruitment is largely driven by a strong belief that one’s transnational com-
munity is confronting an existential threat from a menacing adversary.12 Combatants in
local conflicts deliberately appeal to a shared “transnational identity” among coreligionists
or compatriots abroad in order to internationalize their struggles and draw financial and
material aid from prospective supporters.13 Some recipients of those messages, sensing
that one’s primary identity group is under dire threat, take extraordinary risks to halt the
menace confronting their fictive kin.14 For example, many American and Canadian Jews
volunteered to fight in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) because they saw the rise of
General Francisco Franco as a precursor to spreading fascism around the globe. Fighting
fascism in Spain was not viewed as a distant conflict, but rather as one that would
eventually reach their homelands if left unchallenged.
In the case of Muslim foreign fighters, Islamist insurgents often portray their local
conflicts as part and parcel of a “war on Islam” in which tyrannical regimes and foreign
enemies threaten to subjugate Muslims, repress their movements, and prevent them from
controlling their destiny. They call on Muslims all over the world to come to their aid,
framing the fight abroad as a religiously mandated duty and an opportunity to uphold the
ideal of Pan-Islamic unity.15 As Hegghammer points out, most Western jihadists partici-
pate in foreign conflicts because they see fighting in Muslim lands as legitimate self-
defense, not an act of aggression.16 Two recent studies substantiate the claim that Muslim
foreign fighters from Europe are motivated, in part, by a sense of duty toward suffering
Muslims.17
Threat to transnational identity, however, is insufficient to explain who eventually
heeds the clarion call to join a distant conflict. While the civil conflicts in Syria and
Iraq have attracted foreign fighters from across the globe, a closer look at recruitment at
the national level suggests that volunteerism is geographically clustered, not randomly
diffused, which is indicative of a network effect.18 Moreover, foreign fighters lack common
socioeconomic or ethnic profiles that might offer clues as to their propensity to volunteer,
which raises the question of how does a mobilizing transnational identity form when
collective interests are not readily apparent?
A number of theories have attempted to provide some national level explanation of
who is susceptible to foreign fighter recruitment. These revolve around societal alienation
due to poor integration of Muslims in Europe, which compels some Muslims to look
abroad for alternative sources of identity. Others stress growing concerns about online
radicalization, which is presumed to be the new vector for imbuing a unifying militant
identity among otherwise disparate individuals. We take these two arguments seriously,
but offer an alternative explanation based on the role of peer-to-peer ideological networks.
We explore each of these theories and generate testable implications for the German case
study.
Integration deficit
The challenge of multicultural integration is often posited as the root cause of Muslim
radicalization in Europe, which presumably contributes to the foreign fighter
phenomenon.19 Host society xenophobia and Islamophobia manifest in unemployment
rates that are consistently higher than national averages, subpar educational opportunities,
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and residential segregation into ethnically homogenous neighborhoods. Europeans with
migrant backgrounds, be they first or second generation, are particularly vulnerable to
socioeconomic marginalization because they are seen as undermining the economic well-
being and cultural cohesiveness of their host societies.20
A strong sense of minority discrimination, in turn, has been empirically associated with
greater levels of political violence. Piazza’s statistical analysis of 172 countries between
1970 and 2006 found a link between minority groups’ experience with economic discri-
mination and higher rates of domestic terrorism.21 Victoroff et al. similarly found a link
between a sense of discrimination and support for suicide bombings among Muslims
residing in the West. Analyzing two sets of Pew survey data of a combined 2,677 adult
Muslim residents in Europe and the United States, they concluded “that younger age and
perceived discrimination toward Muslims living in the West are significantly associated
with the attitude that suicide bombing is justified.”22
While neither of these studies address foreign fighter recruitment directly, it is
plausible to extend their analysis to volunteerism in support of transnational militancy.
Indeed, two recent studies offer evidence that foreign fighters from the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France tend to be among those on the margins of society, as evinced by
high rates of unemployment or low wage employment, lower levels of education, and
substantial criminality.23 Extending the integration deficit theory to our German data, we
would expect to find that:
H1: German foreign fighters are disproportionately drawn from the ranks of Muslims with
migrant backgrounds who have not integrated well into German society as indicated by low
rates of citizenship, low educational qualifications, low rates of employment, and high rates
of criminality among the volunteers.
Many of these dimensions of integration—migration background, citizenship, crimin-
ality, employment, and education—are structural and identificational measures that have
been used by others to gauge Muslim integration in Germany.24 They allow us to assess
how the German foreign fighters data compare with trends in the general Muslim
population in Germany, as well as other communities with migrant backgrounds. If the
features of German foreign fighters approximate the trends in those populations, then we
can assume that the integration deficit hypothesis is unsubstantiated—the foreign fighters
are not sufficiently unique from what a random sample would predict. If, on the other
hand, German foreign fighters fare worse than those populations, then we can say that the
integration deficit has support. As a caveat, our data on German foreign fighters (n = 99)
is not large enough to offer conclusive support or disconfirmation of the integration deficit
hypothesis. The findings, therefore, must be treated as suggestive.
Online mobilization
The social media revolution has heightened concerns about the nefarious use of web-based
technologies for radicalization and foreign fighter recruitment.25 Jihadists have indeed
turned to a whole range of social media applications to reach recruits from across the
globe.26 Radicals use these technologies to transmit the message of threat to transnational
identity, and exhibit vivid imagery of Muslim suffering in conflict zones. At a more basic
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level, social media provides information on jihadi arenas and helpful advice on how to
make a journey to distant conflicts.
The relational nature of social media apps such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and
Telegram “provide horizontal communication that is user-generated, interactive, instan-
taneous, highly personalized, and easily mobile. As such, they could assist in forging a
sense of communal belonging that is likely to appeal to some alienated individuals.”27 The
implication of this analysis for German foreign fighters is as follows:
H2a: Social media is a primary vector of foreign fighter radicalization and recruitment,
resulting in fewer interpersonal connections among German volunteers prior to their
mobilization.
H2b: Given the geographic diffusion of social media in Germany, we should observe
geographically dispersed—not clustered—foreign fighter recruitment across Muslim popu-
lated German cities.
Muslims in Germany reside largely within the old Federal states; more than 98% are
spread across those 11 states and East Berlin as of 2008 data.28 We expect the foreign
fighters to come from those states in proportion to the size of their Muslim populations.
Deviation from that expectation would cast doubt on the online mobilization theory. We
collected the Muslim population data at the state level, and determined how many foreign
fighters came from each state to assess the degree of geographical clustering at the state
level. We also investigated if certain cities produced a disproportionate number of foreign
fighters given the size of their migrant/foreign population. Disproportionate recruitment
from certain cities would serve as evidence for clustering, not online radicalization.
Networked mobilization
Social movement theory and social network analysis maintain that preexisting ties and bloc
recruitment are important for militant mobilization.29 Preexisting networks are fertile
ground for mobilization because they bring together like-minded individuals, promote
peer-pressure, and encourage groupthink.30 Dense ideological networks may even offer
their members social status as a reward for participation in radical causes.31 If networks
are a primary mobilizing force, then there should be evidence of geographic clustering and
preexisting ties among foreign fighters that predates their mobilization to the combat area.
Previous research on foreign fighters suggests this is the case. According to Holman,
“Belgian and French foreign fighters might have represented a quarter of all European
foreign fighters in Iraq. . . . Two foreign fighter networks, Kari and 19th, were responsible
for the bulk of these individuals.”32 Others highlight the critical role of jihad veterans to
foreign fighter recruitment because they serve as hubs connecting local networks to
transnational ones.33 Thus, in the German case we should expect to find that:
H3a: German foreign fighters are recruited primarily through preexisting social ties as
evinced by geographic clustering of volunteers and their linkages to other volunteers in a
single network prior to mobilization.
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A corollary to preexisting network ties is the phenomenon of bloc recruitment, which
refers to how militant organizations “often recruit members and participants among
groups of individuals already organized for some other purpose.”34 For example, analysis
of the Sinjar records (a trove of Al Qaeda in Iraq data captured by U.S. forces near Sinjar,
Iraq in 2007) confirmed that nearly half of the 202 foreign fighters with a recorded arrival
date entered Iraq on the same day as someone else from their hometown, which “strongly
suggests that the individuals traveled together as a group.”35 Preexisting social ties within a
political or religious milieu make possible bloc recruitment because of high levels of
interpersonal trust and mutual obligations.36 Tight-knit relationships facilitate the transfer
of beliefs due to at least two psychological needs: avoidance of cognitive dissonance and
validation from valued peers.37 Close associations may also entrap individuals through
what della Porta calls affective focusing and cognitive closure.38 That is, kinship and
friendship ties can transpose radical political commitments, and these commitments, in
turn, intensify bonds of loyalty among kith and kin. Thus, in the German case we should
expect to find that:
H3b: German foreign fighters were mobilized to Syria and Iraq in small groups connected
through friendship and kinship ties, not as disparate individuals traveling on their own.
We collected data on individual and group recruitment to be able to assess to what
extent foreign fighters were recruited or traveled in small groups, and sought qualitative
evidence for friendship and kinship ties among the foreign fighters prior to their
mobilization.
Research design and empirical strategy
We test these three sets of hypotheses using original data collection about German foreign
fighters in Syria and Iraq. By the beginning of 2014, over 300 Germans had joined Syria’s
civil war—eclipsing all previous German Islamist foreign fighter movements in less than
2 years. By 2015, that number more than doubled, reaching 680 foreign fighters in Syria
and Iraq.
We compiled detailed dossiers on 99 German foreign fighters who have traveled (or
attempted to travel) to Syria and Iraq between March 2012 and October 2015. The profiles
are based entirely on unclassified, open source data mostly obtained from German news





Measures of Integration Deficit
(4) Citizenship and immigration status
(5) Occupation and employment status
(6) Educational qualifications
(7) Criminal records prior to mobilization
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Measures of Social Ties: Traditional and Online
(8) German city/state of residence prior to/during mobilization
(9) Network connections to radical milieu prior to mobilization
(10) Group or individual recruitment and travel to combat zones
The biographical data (age, immigration background, gender, etc.) is presented statis-
tically, and the social network data (social ties prior to mobilization) is presented in the
visual analytics program, Palantir. The latter allows enormous quantities of data to be
analyzed visually in order to reveal social network connections among the German foreign
fighters in Syria and Iraq.
To develop our dataset, we collected 143 foreign fighter profiles primarily from the
national news magazine Der Spiegel, followed by Die Welt, BILD, Frankfurt’s Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, and Munich’s Süddeutsche Zeitung. A variety of smaller local news
sources and German television news websites also contributed valuable information. For
three profiles, additional biographical information was found in the Islamic State’s pro-
paganda online magazine, Dabiq. This information concerned the friendship and familial
relationships among three German foreign fighters Ibrahim B. (Abu Junaydah al Almani),
Badr B. (Abu Hafs al Almani), and Fared Saal (Abu Luqman al Almani).39 While
propaganda should generally be treated with suspicion, there is no reason why the
preexisting friendship between Fared Saal and Ibrahim B. and the familial relationship
between Ibrahim and Badr B. should be a fabrication. Finally, two German-language
weblogs were very helpful in assembling the profiles of the German foreign fighters.
Both are considered credible sources by mainstream German media. The first is Jih@d,
which is a side project of German journalist Florian Flade, who also writes on radical
Islamism and foreign fighters for the national publication Die Welt.40 The second blog
consulted for this project was Erasmus Monitor, the author of which remains
anonymous.41
The original list of 143 profiles was eventually reduced to 99 due to lack of sufficient
information. Other names were removed because further research revealed that these had
not actually traveled to Syria or Iraq, but merely provided material support to travelers.
Four of the original 143 profiles were found to be duplicates caused by media reporting
irregularities, such as swapped first and last names and listing of aliases instead of names.
Profiles were kept in the database only when at least two independent sources could be
found to agree that the profiled individual was a German resident prior to departure and
that the person’s apparent intended destination was Syria or Iraq. The two independent
sources could be separate news articles, a weblog and a news report, or a news article and
Dabiq.
Discarded profiles were not entirely abandoned, however; some were retained for use in
the Palantir network analysis. Among the profiles that did not meet the criteria for
inclusion in the primary foreign fighter dataset were individuals identified as recruiters,
supporters, or enablers of foreign fighters. These individuals were added to a separate list
for inclusion in the network analysis because determining interconnectedness of foreign
fighters was a primary objective of this research. For the supporter and recruiter category,
only network connection data was retained.
Indicators of integration into German society included migration background, citizen-
ship, previous criminality, employment status, and educational qualifications. As with all
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such studies, the profiles of the 99 German foreign fighters suffer from information gaps.
One of the limitations of collecting open source data is that the information is not
uniformly accessible for all variables. Since this research was designed to also examine
the network integration of the foreign fighters, however, a larger sample set (n = 99) was
necessary. Therefore, profiles that had good network connection data but were otherwise
short on biographic data were retained. Results presented in this analysis will, therefore,
specify when smaller subsample sizes were used.
We supplemented our own original data collection with a publically released report by
Germany’s domestic intelligence service on residents who have traveled to Syria between
2011 and 2014.42 The Verfassungsschutz report, which analyzes 378 German foreign
fighters known to have departed for Syria by the end of June 2014, helps us fill some
interpretive gaps and refine our own analysis when our data is too small for drawing valid
inferences.
Basic demographic data
Out of the 99 profiles, we have information on the ages of only 60 German foreign
fighters. The average age is 26 years old at the time of departure. Figure 1 offers an age
breakout showing that a substantial majority of subjects were between 19 and 30 years of
age. The average age for women was 21 years old while the average age for men was 27.
Interestingly, the 15–18 age bracket is disproportionately female: six women to two men,
while the other age bins are male-dominated with a maximum of two women in each age
grouping. This suggests a preference towards recruiting exceedingly young women.
In our data, 85 of the foreign fighters are male and 14 are female. With women now
constituting more than one-in-ten German foreign fighters in the combat area, it seems
clear that the traditional gender mix of jihadist foreign combatants has changed in recent
years.43 Current estimates hold that approximately 550 Western women have traveled to
ISIS-held territory, but most do not participate in direct combat.44 It is possible that
having marriageable young women in a jihadist organization like ISIS may play a role in
attracting male recruits. Ebrahim B., a 26-year-old German foreign fighter from the town
of Wolfsburg who returned from Syria disillusioned in 2014, summarizes how carnal
incentives were part of the jihadists’ recruitment pitch. Ebrahim tells a 2015 television
interview, “You would like to build a family and marry? In Germany or in Europe
everything is expensive. There you can marry . . . from an Islamic perspective, marry
four women! Who wouldn’t want to have four women, to be honest?”45
Figure 1. Age at time of travel.
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Integration in German society
We collected data on the migration background, citizenship status, criminal history, and
employment and education status of German foreign fighters to test the integration deficit
hypothesis. We compare the features of foreign fighters with the larger Muslim population
in Germany and other residents with migrant and non-migrant backgrounds in order to
assess how divergent their features are from broader societal trends.
Ethnicity and migration background
As of 2008, German society is estimated to have 3.8–4.3 million Muslims out of a total
population of 82 million, which means Muslims constitute approximately 4–5% of the
total population.46 The vast majority have migrant backgrounds of Turkish origins
(approximately 63%), followed by southeast Europeans (about 14%), Middle Easterners
(about 8% excluding Iran and Turkey), North Africans (roughly 7%), and the rest from
Central Asia, Iran, South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa (about 8% in
total).47 Estimates of converts to Islam are as high as 100,000, which is less than 1% of
the Muslim population in Germany.48
Assuming that individuals with migrant backgrounds have a “substantially poorer
situation”49 in Germany than those without migrant backgrounds, it would be fair to
predict that foreign fighters from Germany would be overwhelmingly individuals with
migrant backgrounds. Of the 99 German foreign fighters we profiled, we have information
on the national origins of 61. Of these, 13 were native Germans with both parents having
German ancestry. That is a high number given that nearly all the Muslim population in
Germany has a migrant background, even those with German citizenship. The remaining
48 had a migration background with at least one parent of non-German descent.
Furthermore, 10 were specifically identified in press reports as first-generation immigrants
to Germany and 12 were identified as second- or even third-generation immigrants. The
national backgrounds of the 61 fighters for whom information was available are shown in
Figure 2.
The origins of the remaining 38 foreign fighters can be inferred from their first names
and conversion status. Four of the 38 are assessed to be native Germans because of their
traditional German names and conversion to Islam. That puts the total percentage of
Figure 2. Migration background by region (n = 61).
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volunteers with no migrant background at 17%. The remaining 34 individuals were likely
to have some migration background because they have names like Amira, Fatih, Ismail,
and Samir, which do not conclusively prove migrant heritage, but strongly suggest it.
Converts to Islam are substantially overrepresented among foreign fighters. Of the 99
travelers, 23 were listed as converts to Islam, which is only slightly higher than reported in
the Verfassungsschutz study (18%). Given that converts are estimated at less than 1% of the
total Muslim population in Germany, these numbers are astonishingly high. As noted
earlier, 13 of these 23 were native Germans with no traceable migrant background. They
had names like David Gäble, Christian Emde, and Philip Bergner. Of the remaining ten
converts, three came from decidedly Western backgrounds (U.S.-German, UK-German,
and Italian-German). Two other converts had migration backgrounds from Ghana and
one from Poland. Three others were identified as converts, but their ethnic and migration
backgrounds could not be determined. The overrepresentation of German Muslims with-
out a migrant background, which overlaps with high rates of converts among the foreign
fighters, suggests that having a migration background was not a necessary condition for
becoming a foreign fighter.
Citizenship
A potential measure of integration is citizenship. Rabasa and Benard find that Germans
with a migration background who have German citizenship do score better on other
measures of integration including education and employment.50 About 45% of Muslims in
German have citizenship.51 Yet according to the Verfassungsschutz study, 233 of the 378
travelers (nearly 62%) had German citizenship at the time of travel, which is 17% higher
than would be predicted by random selection. Of the 233, 141 (37%) of the travelers had
exclusively German citizenship; 92 (25%) had German and secondary (dual) citizenship.
Among this group of 92 travelers with dual or multiple citizenships were the following: 18
German-Moroccans, 17 German-Turks, 12 German-Syrians, and ten each for German-
Afghans and German-Tunisians. Finally, foreign citizenship numbers included 54 Turkish
citizens (14%), 19 Syrian citizens (5%), and 13 with Russian citizenship (4%). Another
13% were listed as “other” and 2% as “unknown.” German citizenship, therefore, did not
act as a countervailing factor in the recruitment of foreign fighters.
Criminal Backgrounds
A proxy measure of integration in German society is criminality, which can be seen as
both a symptom and a cause of poor integration in society. Disenfranchised people may
have greater incentive to commit crimes, and having a criminal past often excludes people
from greater levels of participation in society. Among the 99 German foreign fighters
profiled, 16 had clearly discoverable criminal backgrounds (press reports implied connec-
tions to criminal milieus for several others, but these implications were too ambiguous to
warrant inclusion in the foreign fighter profiles). At 16%, the number of foreign fighters
with criminal backgrounds is high, but it is not certain how much higher than general
societal trends. In 2013 data on public prosecutions of illegal acts by regional and local
courts in Germany, nearly 5.3 million persons were prosecuted, which is a little more than
6% of the German population (assuming no repeat offenders, which is a doubtful
670 S. C. REYNOLDS AND M. M. HAFEZ
assumption).52 The number of young male adults (18 years old or higher) suspected of
crime is 1.37 million, which is 1.67% of the German population.53 Without probing
further, it would appear that the number of German foreign fighters with criminal back-
grounds is substantially higher than would be predicted by general societal trends.
The Verfassungsschutz report—with its superior access to government records—shows
an even higher rate of pre-mobilization criminality. The report found that 117 of the 378
travelers (about 31%) had criminal records with local, state, or federal police before
radicalizing (see Figure 3).54 Most common pre-radicalization offenses were violent
crime, property crimes, and politically motivated crimes.55 Thus, the data on criminality
indicates that according to one measure of the integration deficit, a substantial number of
German foreign fighters were on the margins of German society before joining the radical
milieu.
Employment
Disproportionately high unemployment rates among German Muslims might signal poor
integration due to lack of educational skills, societal discrimination, or limited economic
opportunities in the cities they inhabit. To assess the role of unemployment in the foreign
fighter phenomenon, we look at the rate of unemployment among German foreign fight-
ers in the Verfassungsschutz study and compare them to rates of unemployment among
other Germans with and without migrant backgrounds.
The Verfassungsschutz study reports that out of the 378 German foreign fighters, 82
(21%) were unemployed. This figure is substantially higher than unemployment trends in
German society at large and in comparison to migrant unemployment rates. According to
data from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), foreign-













Figure 3. Pre-radicalization criminal records.
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native-born men was 4.8%.56 Youth unemployment rates in Germany between 2012 and
2014 were between 8% and 9%. When we look at unemployment rates among German
Muslims with migrant backgrounds, we discover that in 2008 approximately 4.2% of
Turks, 8.3% of North Africans, and 12.8% of Middle Easterners were unemployed.57
Even if we account for the global economic crisis since 2008, an unemployment rate of
21% among the foreign fighters seems well above societal trends by 2014.
Education
The level of education completed may indicate a person’s access to opportunities for
upward mobility. German press reports revealed education information for 27 of the 99
fighters. Like the unemployment data, the education information reveals that German
foreign fighters tend to perform below average in the German education system. Of the 27
profiles, only two had completed undergraduate degrees. Four of the fighters completed
some college before departing. Eleven had completed secondary school and five were
identified as high-school dropouts. According to the Verfassungsschutz report, of those
travelers who had completed secondary education, 35% graduated from the more presti-
gious college-preparatory Gymnasien and 27% had completed the mid-tier Realschule—
slightly below national averages of 43% and 35% for these schools, respectively.58
In summary, after a close look at five measures of integration—migrant background,
citizenship, criminality, employment, and education—the data reveals mixed support for
the integration deficit hypothesis (H1). The 99 foreign fighters included many migrants,
but also a surprisingly high number of native Germans, usually converts, who from a
cultural and linguistic perspective would be completely integrated within German society
(unless their conversion exposed them to societal ostracism). The majority of foreign
fighters had German citizenship, which is a positive indictor of integration. On the other
hand, the high rate of criminal backgrounds, combined with relatively lower educational
levels and higher unemployment rates among the volunteers, does indicate that this group
as a whole may have been on the margins of German society.
Social network analysis
We analyzed the extent of geographic clustering in the recruitment of 99 German foreign
fighters at the state and city levels, and discovered that there are indeed geographic clusters,
mainly at the city level. A state-level analysis reveals that nearly half of the fighters (43) lived
in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia before mobilization. The second most
common state of origin was Hessen, followed by Lower Saxony. Table 1 shows the foreign
fighter distribution among Germany’s 16 federal states and the variance between estimated
Muslim population size per state (as of 2008)59 and the percentage of foreign fighters from
each state. Other than North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg, the variance at the
state level is not all that significant. The former produced 10% more than expected, while
Baden-Württemberg produced about 10% less than expected.
We did not find data on the size of Muslim populations at the city level. Therefore, to
assess the degree of clustering at the city level, we focused on North Rhine-Westphalia,
where nearly one-third of German Muslims live. We looked at 2011 census data for 71
cities in that state. For each city, we calculated the number of individuals with migration
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and foreign (non-citizen) backgrounds as a percentage of the total city population. If
clustering is occurring at the city level, we should observe that large numbers of foreign
fighters come from few cities, not all 71 cities. Moreover, if the integration deficit
hypothesis is valid, we should expect to see volunteers derive from cities with high
percentages of migrant/foreign populations.
Table 2 shows clustering within three cities—Bonn, Solingen, and Dinslaken.
Collectively, they produced 24 out of the 43 foreign fighters from North Rhine-
Westphalia (about 56%). Furthermore, only 17 of the 71 cities produced foreign fighters,
even though all of the cities contain populations that are at least 15% migrant/foreign.
Lastly, while two of the three cluster cities have above average migrant/foreign popula-
tions, some of the cities with the largest percentages of individuals with such backgrounds
produced zero or few foreign fighters. Dinslaken (one of the cluster cities with seven
foreign fighters) falls well below average for migrant/foreign population (21.1%), and 41
cities that have higher populations of migrants/foreigners than Dinslaken produced zero
foreign fighters in our study. This evidence casts doubt on the explanatory power of the
integration deficit hypothesis (H1), and provides support for geographic clustering (H3a).
The other major cluster cities in our data are Frankfurt (12 foreign fighters) in the state
of Hessen, and Wolfsburg (nine foreign fighters) in the state of Lower Saxony. Hessen has
five independent cities and produced a total of 14 foreign fighters, yet 12 out of the 14
came out of Frankfurt. Lower Saxony has eight major cities, but all nine of its foreign
fighters came out of Wolfsburg. Interestingly, the state of Baden-Württemberg, which is
the third largest in terms of Muslim population size, is underrepresented in the list of
foreign fighters despite producing seven militants. This is further evidence that mobiliza-
tion is clustered, not geographically diffused, as hypothesis H2b would predict.
Radical Milieu
The German foreign fighter network was largely constituted by Islamists emanating from
what German analysts call the Salafist scene, which is an umbrella term used to describe a
range of activities by known Salafist preachers and organizations. Among a Muslim
population of approximately four million, fewer than 10 thousand of these adhere to the
Table 1. Foreign fighter state of origin (N = 99).
State State Muslim Population (%) Foreign Fighters from State (%) Variance
North Rhine-Westphalia 33.1% 43.43% + 10.34%
Hessen 10.3% 14.14% + 3.84%
Lower Saxony 6.2% 9.09% + 2.89%
Baden-Württemberg 16.6% 7.07% −9.53%
Bavaria 13.2% 6.06% −7.14%
Berlin 6.9% 6.06% No Var.
Hamburg 3.5% 4.04% No Var.
Bremen 1.6% 2.02% No Var.
Schleswig-Holstein 2.1% 2.02% No Var.
Saxony-Anhalt 0.4% 1.01% No Var.
Thuringia 0.2% 1.01% No Var.
Brandenburg 0.1% – –
Mecklenburg-W. Pom. 0.1% – –
Rhineland-Palatinate 4.0% – –
Saarland 0.8% – –
Saxony 0.7% – –
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Lüdenscheid 72,980 62,940.0 15,980 10,040 35.7%
Paderborn 141,730 131,270.0 39,160 10,460 35.0%
Gütersloh 93,710 85,270.0 23,380 8,440 34.0%
Bielefeld 323,650 287,120.0 69,920 36,530 32.9%
Düsseldorf 582,760 489,070.0 97,980 93,690 32.9% 1
Hagen 187,010 163,680.0 37,830 23,320 32.7%
Herford 64,830 59,470.0 15,610 5,360 32.3% 3
Lünen 85,700 76,880.0 18,890 8,820 32.3%
Köln 997,900 836,220.0 160,490 161,680 32.3% 1
Leverkusen 158,590 140,490.0 32,840 18,100 32.1% 1
Troisdorf 72,230 64,380.0 15,130 7,860 31.8%
Wuppertal 340,960 295,940.0 63,340 45,020 31.8% 1
Duisburg 486,750 414,370.0 79,630 72,380 31.2%
Bonn 304,020 267,600.0 57,680 36,430 31.0% 9
Aachen 234,840 205,380.0 40,960 29,460 30.0% 1
Neuss 149,680 132,050.0 27,050 17,640 29.9%
Remscheid 109,550 94,730.0 17,880 14,820 29.8%
Gelsenkirchen 256,800 222,820.0 41,550 33,980 29.4%
Düren 87,990 78,020.0 15,850 9,970 29.3%
Hamm 175,310 157,260.0 33,150 18,050 29.2%
Iserlohn 94,150 85,460.0 18,790 8,690 29.2%
Detmold 73,170 69,180.0 17,220 3,990 29.0%
Solingen 154,300 134,960.0 25,350 19,340 29.0% 8
Dortmund 568,820 500,130.0 95,800 68,690 28.9%
Lipp 64,660 58,910.0 12,640 5,760 28.5%
Ahlen 51,960 46,210.0 8,920 5,750 28.2%
Krefeld 221,130 196,850.0 38,130 24,280 28.2%
Siegen 99,060 90,400.0 19,160 8,660 28.1% 1
Sankt Augustin 53,740 49,950.0 11,050 3,790 27.6%
Herne 154,590 136,660.0 24,600 17,930 27.5%
Menden
(Sauerland)
54,250 50,430.0 11,100 3,820 27.5%
Minden 79,710 74,800.0 16,620 4,910 27.0%
Velbert 80,920 72,630.0 12,950 8,290 26.2%
Mönchengladbach 253,720 228,890.0 40,650 24,820 25.8% 2
Moers 103,550 93,800.0 16,820 9,750 25.7%
Gladbeck 73,690 66,070.0 10,960 7,620 25.2% 1
Unna 58,710 55,340.0 11,420 3,380 25.2%
Essen 563,160 508,370.0 83,310 54,800 24.5%
Recklinghausen 115,530 105,290.0 17,920 10,240 24.4%
Bergheim 58,760 52,550.0 8,110 6,200 24.4% 1
Euskirchen 55,000 51,250.0 9,610 3,750 24.3% 2
Dormagen 61,940 56,730.0 9,730 5,210 24.1%
Hürth 54,880 50,310.0 8,400 4,570 23.6%
Mülheim an der
Ruhr
166,290 149,200.0 22,180 17,100 23.6%
Bochum 360,470 331,530.0 55,860 28,950 23.5% 1
Oberhausen 209,220 186,390.0 26,250 22,830 23.5%
Bottrop 116,820 108,030.0 18,270 8,790 23.2%
Bad Salzuflen 52,090 48,460.0 8,400 3,630 23.1%
Bergisch Gladbach 108,350 100,000.0 16,250 8,350 22.7% 1
Witten 96,010 88,780.0 14,330 7,240 22.5%
Herten 61,300 54,750.0 7,180 6,550 22.4%
Marl 84,240 77,680.0 12,300 6,560 22.4%
Kerpen 63,140 57,190.0 8,060 5,950 22.2%
Langenfeld 56,580 52,340.0 8,140 4,240 21.9%
(Continued )
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fundamentalist interpretation of Islam known as Salafism. Some of these have taken up an
extreme version of Salafism that embraces jihadism.60 Collectively, Salafists engage in mis-
sionary work, Internet outreach, and have visible presence in German cities and towns.
Activities the German government considers part of the scene include Islamic seminars,
Qur’an distribution, Salafist mosques, and benefit events for Salafist causes (most commonly
in areas of the world where Salafists perceive Muslim groups to be suffering). Spiritual and
charismatic leadership of the scene comes from several popular Salafist preachers, including
Hassan Dabbagh, Ibrahim Abou Nagie, Pierre Vogel, and Sven Lau. These preachers
present their dawa (proselytizing) in German, generating a wide following among second-
and third-generation immigrants as well as native German followers.61
Figure 4 is an overview of the network, connecting the 99 profiled German foreign
fighters to each other and to Salafist organizations or preachers prior to going abroad. It
also situates them geographically by linking them to the nine major cities from which they
came. Nodes on the network map are color-coded by type. Red nodes represent the original
99 foreign fighters and the red links indicate personal connections among those nodes. Blue
nodes and links represent the recruiters, supporters, and preachers of the Salafist scene.
Yellow nodes and links represent prominent Salafist scene organizations and their inter-
connections. Finally, the burgundy nodes represent key cluster cities identified in our study.
The first thing to note is that most of the profiled fighters were mobilized within a
single interconnected network. The overall German foreign fighter map in Figure 4 shows
ten orphan nodes in the top left corner. Orphan nodes are those nodes that have no
verifiable connection to any other node in the network. Additionally, three pairs of nodes
are displayed below the orphan nodes. These represent foreign fighters who, while
connected to one another, could not be tied to the larger network.
Breaking the network map down by connection types allows a clearer understanding of


































Grevenbroich 61,620 55,640.0 7,450 5,980 21.8%
Stolberg 56,110 50,980.0 6,940 5,130 21.5%
Dinslaken 67,610 62,850.0 9,480 4,760 21.1% 7
Ratingen 86,290 79,780.0 11,560 6,510 20.9%
Hattingen 54,020 50,610.0 7,900 3,410 20.9%
Arnsberg 74,060 69,450.0 10,530 4,610 20.4%
Münster 287,060 266,530.0 38,040 20,530 20.4%
Ibbenbüren 50,360 48,160.0 7,830 2,200 19.9%
Pulheim 52,880 49,600.0 7,130 3,280 19.7%
Eschweiler 54,500 50,500.0 6,400 4,010 19.1%
Wesel 59,970 56,350.0 7,770 3,620 19.0%
Rheine 72,490 68,400.0 9,580 4,080 18.8%
Castrop-Rauxel 74,440 69,560.0 9,000 4,870 18.6% 2
Viersen 74,470 68,750.0 7,750 5,720 18.1%
Willich 50,110 47,150.0 5,350 2,960 16.6%
Dorsten 76,670 73,420.0 8,510 3,250 15.3%
Bocholt 70,800 66,760.0 6,670 4,050 15.1%
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of the connected nodes within the network is retained. When different layers of the
network map are removed, some nodes become disconnected (orphaned) from the rest
of the network. Orphan nodes and pairs are displayed in the top left corner of the map. In
this way, we reveal the significance of connection types.
Personal connections among foreign fighters
The first level of the link analysis (Figure 5) shows all of the personal friendship connec-
tions and associations between each of the 99 foreign fighters before they departed to the
combat area. Each node on the network map represents a single German foreign fighter.
This analysis shows that 71 of the 99 profiles had a personal connection with at least one
other German foreign fighter before departing Germany. This initial network picture also
shows 27 orphan nodes and 7 disconnected pairs. Finally this first level of link analysis
shows three distinctive clusters of individual fighters. These clusters correlate geographi-
cally to Dinslaken, Bonn, and Wolfsburg.
Connections with recruiters, supporters, and Salafist scene activists
While maintaining the relative position of the 99 fighters on the map, the connections to
recruiters, supporters, and Salafist scene leaders is added in Figure 6 and is represented as
Figure 4. The German foreign fighter network.
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blue-colored nodes and links. In total, 35 fighters had links to one or more recruiters,
supporters, or Salafist scene leaders before departure. When these relationships are added
to the network map, the number of orphan nodes is reduced to just 17 with only five pairs
of fighters remaining disconnected from other fighters or recruiters. Therefore, 82 of the
99 profiled fighters had preexisting peer-to-peer relationships with at least one fighter,
recruiter, supporter, or Salafist scene leader before their departure to Syria and Iraq.
Group membership and participation
The next layer on the network mapping (Figure 7) depicts Salafist groups—most impor-
tantly Lies! and Millatu Ibrahim—in yellow. Our analysis identified 20 fighters with
membership in Millatu Ibrahim and 18 who had participated with the Lies! Qur’an
distribution campaign. Five of the fighters are linked to both Lies! and Millatu Ibrahim.
Other Salafist organizations on the map include Salafist mosques, dawa organizations, and
jihadist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
Establishing that these fighters belonged to the same formal and informal organizations
does not mean that they knew one another. Indeed, both Lies! and Millatu Ibrahim had
members in multiple German cities and it would be unrealistic to assume that all members
of these organizations knew all other members. Shared membership in such organizations
Figure 5. Personal connections among foreign fighters before travel.
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Figure 6. Foreign fighter links to recruiters, supporters, and salafist leaders.
Figure 7. Connections to Salafist organizations.
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does, however, establish that these fighters were part of a common network before their
mobilization.
When the group links are added to the network map in Figure 7, the number of orphan
nodes is reduced to just 14 with three remaining disconnected pairs. Thus, the network
mapping analysis shows that 79 out of 99 profiles were mobilized out of an interconnected
Salafist network inside Germany, which is strong evidence for hypothesis H3a. Only 20
foreign fighters could not be directly linked to the network—making it plausible to suggest
that these 20 were radicalized and recruited online. A closer examination of these
remaining fighters is therefore necessary in order to determine whether all 20 were, in
fact, truly disconnected from the Salafist scene and whether they may have been radica-
lized through social media instead of through peer-to-peer networks.
Peer-to-peer or online mobilization?
The 20 remaining foreign fighters consist of 14 men and 6 women. Their average age is 24
and they come from 18 different cities in Germany. A qualitative analysis of their back-
ground reveals four broad assessments of their online radicalization: confirmed, likely,
possible, and unlikely (see Figure 8).
In the confirmed category, German press reports indicate online social media was the
primary radicalization factor. All four of these cases involved women who were recruited
through undisclosed social media contacts. Each came from a different German city,
though each linked up with one other woman immediately before traveling to Turkey.
Fighters in the likely category were similarly geographically unconnected to each other
and press reports provide no indication of face-to-face contact with the Salafist scene. At
the same time, press reports do not specifically cite online factors in their radicalization
either. This group includes two women and one man. One of the women, Sarah O, has
since become a regular blogger, encouraging other young women to join her in Syria.62
The possible category group of the unconnected fighters has the lowest overall informa-
tion density when it comes to network connections. This group includes the twins Kevin
and Mark K from the North Rhine-Westphalia city of Catrop Rauxel. According to Dabiq,
the twin converts died as suicide bombers in a battle near Baiji, Iraq.63 Detailed German
press reports about Kevin’s and Mark’s histories reveal no specific connection to the
Salafist scene, though Kevin is said have come under the “influence” of radical Salafist
preachers.64 The exact radicalizing influences for these fighters remain unclear, but online
social media may have been a factor.
Figure 8. Assessment of online radicalization for 20 unconnected volunteers.
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The final group of unconnected fighters includes four fighters who were most likely
either part of the Salafist scene or were at least mobilized in peer-to-peer encounters. The
first, Aleaddine T, could not be directly tied to other fighters, although several reports
claim he was part of the Wolfsburg group. The other three fighters in this category are
Aslanbek F, Kerim Mark B, and Yannik Pipiorka.
Aslanbek F, a Chechen-German from Kiel, traveled to Syria in December 2012 with a
group of eight other men whose names were not identified. He was killed in clashes
outside of Aleppo shortly after arriving. German newspaper interviews with Aslanbek’s
wife reveal that in the days after his death, his family received visitors from “all over
Europe” who both knew about Aslanbeck’s death and (like his wife) believed Aslanbek to
be a martyr.65 Before his departure, Aslanbek had attended the Ibnu Taymiyya Mosque in
Kiel, which has been under observation by the German authorities for radicalizing several
members and sending them to fight in jihadist causes. Despite the similarities between
Aslanbek’s story and the stories of countless other German foreign fighters, no links could
be found in German media that would connect Aslanbek to the rest of the network.
Nevertheless, based on the description of Aslanbek’s departure in a group of eight others
and his ties to a fundamentalist mosque, it seems likely that Aslanbek was recruited and
mobilized within a traditional social network.
Kerim Mark B is a volunteer who traveled back to Germany to have a shrapnel
wound treated before returning to Syria in 2014. Kerim first appeared in German
media in 2012 when his name was added to a government list of potentially dangerous
Islamists living in Germany.66 At the time Kerim was living in Düsseldorf and was
active in a Salafist mosque near the city’s central train depot. Like Aslanbek F, Kerim
was likely connected with the Salafist scene, but those contacts could not be verified in
German press reports.
Yannik Pipiorka was a developmentally challenged and occasionally homeless 23-
year-old Polish-German. Prior to his travel to Syria, Yannik lived on the streets in the
Southern German city of Freiburg. According to acquaintances and social workers in
Freiburg, Yannik encountered his jihadist recruiters on the streets of Freiburg.
Subsequent searches for evidence that Yannik may have been radicalized online were
fruitless because he had no social media accounts. Yannik’s radicalization took place
between the fall of 2013 and the summer of 2014, when he departed for Turkey and then
on to Syria. In May of 2015, Yannik made headlines in Germany after detonating an
explosives-laden truck at a checkpoint in Baiji, Iraq, killing himself and eight Iraqi
soldiers.67
Data from the German security report identified social media as an “influential
radicalizations factor” in 67 cases during the pre-radicalization phase. However, of
these 67, only 13 were not also connected to either the Salafist scene, or did not have
family, friend, or school connections to Salafist networks. Thus, only six percent of the
pre-radicalization cases were identified as being exclusively influenced by the jihadi
social media in the early stages of radicalization. During the later phases of radicaliza-
tion the number of online-only cases drops to just three percent.68 In sum, the
overwhelming empirical evidence shows that, contrary to hypothesis H2a, social
media was not a significant mobilization factor independent of actual peer-to-peer
networks.
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Bloc recruitment
The mobilization and travel patterns of the 99 foreign fighters reveal that over one third
(34 out of 99) traveled to the combat area in groups, including friends and family, which is
strong evidence for the bloc recruitment hypothesis (H3b). Only one of the 99 fighters,
Yannik Pipiorka, was specifically listed in German press reports as having traveled alone.
The Verfassungsschutz study also showed that 140 out of 263 travelers (53%) departed
Germany with friends; only 54 (14%) were identified as having departed alone. The
combined number known to have traveled in groups of friends or family is 209 out of
263, or 79 percent. Another government study of foreign fighters from Berlin shows that
35% of the 60 who traveled to Syria or Iraq between 2012 and 2015 did so with some
combination of spouses and children.69
Conclusion
Understanding the foreign fighters phenomenon is a pressing international security con-
cern. Foreign fighters often flock to extremist groups in civil conflicts, and are potentially
destabilizing, violent, and less amenable to demobilization and reintegration than local
forces.70 Some will undoubtedly return to conduct attacks against their homelands, or
disperse to conflict zones where they could leverage their militant skills.71 It is estimated
that one out of every nine foreign fighters is likely to conduct a “blowback” attack in their
home country after returning from fighting abroad.72 Indeed, attacks in Paris and Brussels
in November 2015 and March 2016, respectively, involved individuals who had traveled as
foreign fighters to Syria or Iraq. A better understanding of the causal factors involved in
foreign fighter mobilization should help governments craft policies to sever an important
source of support for transnational extremists, and could potentially aid in mitigating
foreign conflicts and diminish the rate of international terrorist attacks.
In this study, we presented original data on 99 German foreign fighters and supple-
mented it with a German government report to explain how more than 400 German
foreign fighters mobilized for Syria and Iraq between 2011 and 2015. We tested three sets
of hypotheses that revolve around failed integration, online radicalization, and social
network mobilization.
The data lends some support for the integration deficit hypothesis in Germany, and
comports with other studies that have found high rates of unemployment, lower levels of
education, and high rates of criminality among foreign fighters from the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France.73 However, several other findings suggest additional research is
necessary to validate the integration deficit theory. The integration deficit hypothesis does
not account for the statistically significant number of native German converts joining the
movement, nor does it explain why citizenship—a positive indicator of integration—did
not make Germans any less likely to join the foreign fighter movement. Lastly, some of the
cluster cities from which foreign fighters hailed were not ones with high percentages of
individuals with migrant heritage or foreign backgrounds, while other cities with high
concentrations of migrant/foreign populations produced few or no foreign fighters.
Concerning online mobilization, our study finds meager evidence to support the
contention that online recruitment is a primary vector of radicalization or that it has
supplanted peer-to-peer recruitment. In our data of 99 recruits, somewhere between four
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and seven percent of foreign fighters are reliably coded as online mobilization. This was
particularly the case among female and younger recruits. The Verfassungsschutz study
finds that only six percent of German foreign fighters were recruited or mobilized solely
through online social networks.74 These findings accord with Rabasa and Benard’s con-
tention that “the transition from radicalization to terrorism almost always takes place in
face-to-face encounters and very seldom on the internet.”75
Concerning the social network mobilization hypotheses, link analysis of the 99 German
foreign fighters in our dataset has shown that nearly 80% were mobilized within a single
interconnected network. Our analysis also shows that the phenomenon of German foreign
fighters is geographically clustered, not diffused. Nearly half of our dataset originated from
North Rhine-Westphalia, and three cities within that state—Bonn, Solingen, and Dinslaken
—produced 55% of those foreign fighters. Moreover, most of the recruits emanated from the
so-called Salafist scene, not from mainstream Islamic organizations. Lastly, both our research
and the German government findings show high levels of bloc recruitment. Between one
third (our data) and one half (Verfassungsschutz report) of all German foreign fighters
traveled to the combat areas as groups of friends or family. All these findings align well
with social network analysis, showing that similar to other radical movements, jihadists in
Germany recruit within dense social networks and preexisting formal and informal groups.
Our study highlighted at least three areas that merit additional research. The unprece-
dented percentage of female recruits being drawn into the jihadist foreign fighter move-
ment remains underexplored. Our data demonstrated that women are more frequently
recruited through social media than their male counterparts. Additionally women are
recruited at younger ages. This suggests that gender is an important variable in differential
recruitment patterns.
Another puzzle that warrants attention is the high rates of converts within the foreign
fighter movement. Despite being less than one percent of the entire Muslim population in
Germany, converts constituted at least 23% of the foreign fighters in our data. What is it
about conversion that might contribute to radicalization and mobilization abroad?
Perhaps this phenomenon reflects the recruiters’ preferences for attracting non-traditional
fighters to their movement.
The last area that merits follow-on research relates to extending our geographic analysis
to the neighborhood level within German cities. We limited our analysis of clustering to
71 cities within the state that has the largest concentration of Muslims. While this research
design revealed significant geographic clusters, it did not show whether the clustering
effect continued down to the district, neighborhood, or local mosque levels within
German cities. A close examination of smaller geographic areas may shed light on the
integration factors that were not satisfactorily explained in this study. Neighborhood-level
economic and census data, overlaid with foreign fighter mobilization data, may reveal
patterns related to Muslim integration in German society. Such research could help refine
scholarly understanding of how integration factors relate to the formation of radical
networks that drive foreign fighter mobilization.
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